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The Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) is the latest phase of debt reduction for 
poor countries from the World Bank, the IMF, and the African Development Bank.  The 
MDRI, which will come close to full debt reduction for at least 19 (and perhaps as many 
as 40) qualifying countries, is being presented as a momentous leap forward in the battle 
against global poverty.  However, the analysis in this paper suggests that the actual gains 
may be more modest and elusive.  This is not because, as some anti-debt campaigners 
fear, that the initiative is a mere accounting trick.  Rather, the limited short-term 
financial impact of the MDRI on affected countries is because the debt service 
obligations being relieved were themselves relatively insignificant.  For example, in 
2004 the average African country in the program paid $19 million in debt service to the 
World Bank, but received 10 times that amount in new Bank credit and more than 50 
times as much in total aid.   Just as importantly, finances are rarely the binding 
constraint on poverty and other development outcomes.  This is not to say that the 
MDRI is futile.  Indeed the impact could be considerable over the long-term, especially 
on the ability of creditors to be more selective in the future.  But most of the impact of 
the MDRI will be long-term and difficult to measure. As such, expectations of the effect 
on indebted countries and development indicators should be kept modest and time 
horizons long.   
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Introduction 
 
In 2006 the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the African 
Development Bank (AfDB) will implement the next major phase of debt reduction for 
poor countries.  The plan, now known as the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), 
was first agreed by the G8 in June 2005 and has since been approved by the boards of the 
international financial institutions.  The IMF has already begun implementation, and the 
World Bank and AfDB will follow suit beginning in July 2006.  The MDRI has promised 
it will erase ‘as much as 100 percent’ of the debts owed by qualifying countries, the vast 
majority of which are in sub-Saharan Africa.  Although this is being presented as a 
momentous leap forward for Africa and the battle against global poverty, the actual gains 
may be more modest and elusive.  Hopes for a transformative impact on poverty―or 
even a meaningful effect on the cash flow of African treasuries―are unlikely to be 
realized.  This does not imply that the MDRI is meaningless, but rather that the potential 
benefits are far from certain, likely to be long-term, and are not of the kind that many 
activists or observers may be expecting.   
 
Origins of Africa’s debt burden 
 
For much of the post-independence period Africa has seen rising debt levels, at least up 
until the mid-1990s.  In 1970 the external public or publicly-guaranteed debt stock for all 
of sub-Saharan Africa was just $5.7 billion (or $22 billion in 2003 dollars).
2  This grew 
steadily throughout the 1980s and peaked at $190 billion in 1995 before settling at around 
$177 billion at end-2003 (see Figure 1).  This represented a rise from about 13 percent of 
regional GNI to over 100 percent by the mid-1990s before dropping to around 70 percent 
in 2003.  At the same time, the debt service payments increased from about $2 billion 
(2003 dollars) in 1970 to over $12 billion in 1985 before sloping back down.  The debt 
service ratio also rose and then fell roughly in parallel (see Figure 2). 
 
 
                                                 
2 All aggregate debt figures exclude South Africa.  The main source for debt data used throughout this 
section is the World Bank’s Global Development Finance.   4
Figure 1 



















































PPG Debt Stock (2003 US$ bn) – Left Scale
PPG Debt Stock/GNI (%) – Right Scale
Note: All data excludes South Africa. 
Source: 2005 World Bank Global Development Finance database  
 
Figure 2 

















































PPG Debt Service (2003 US$ bn) – Left Scale
PPG Debt Service/Exports (%) – Right Scale
Note: All data exclude South Africa. 
Source: 2005 World Bank Global Development Finance database  
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For many of the larger developing countries which have faced debt crises, such as 
Mexico and Brazil in the 1980s, the problem can be traced back to unsustainable 
borrowing combined with rising global interest rates.  For nearly all African countries, 
however, the story is very different.  Few African governments have had access to private 
capital markets and almost all their borrowing has been from official sources, such as 
bilateral donors (like the UK or Japanese governments) or the multilateral agencies, 
especially the World Bank, IMF, and the AfDB.  Unlike private creditors, these 
institutions provided loans at very low fixed interest rates with long grace periods.  For 
example, the loan terms for the International Development Association (IDA, the low-
income window at the World Bank) are 40 years at 0.75 percent interest and a ten year 
grace period.   
 
Instead, Africa’s debt problems are mainly the result of slow economic and export 
growth, combined with the perverse effects of the international aid system. Countries 
borrowed funds on extremely soft terms, but they were still unable to repay the loans 
because those investments never produced the expected gains.  Thus the rise of Africa’s 
debt ratios (debt stock/GNI or debt service/exports) is in many ways not so much a 
problem with the numerators growing too fast as it is of the denominators growing too 
slowly (or for many countries not at all).   This is why there is very little divergence over 
the past three decades between the absolute figures and the ratios.   
 
Africa’s real growth of GNI has averaged just 1.1 percent since 1970, far less than 
population growth.  If the region had instead grown at a modest 3 percent (assuming 
borrowing was the same), its current debt would be just 37 percent of GNI instead of 70 
percent.  If the region had grown at 5 percent, the ratio would drop to only 19 percent 
(Figure 3).  Repeating this exercise for exports shows similar results, with the debt 
service ratio dropping from the actual rate of 6.8 percent of exports to only 3.7 percent if 
export growth had been a modest 3 percent.  It is true that long-term secular declines in 
the prices of some commodities produced by African countries may have suppressed 
export levels and exacerbated the problem.  But the most important factor in the 
emergence of the African debt problem has been the underlying lack of expansion in real 
income or exports. 
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Figure 3 
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3% growth scenario
5% growth scenario
Note: All data exclude South Africa. 





Another factor in Africa’s debt burden has been the way donors, and the multilaterals in 
particular, allocate loans.  Most of the bilateral donors have shifted from loans to grants, 
leaving the World Bank and the AfDB as the main source of loans for many African 
countries.  IDA, for example, uses a score, the Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment (CPIA), to skew its resources toward better performing countries.  This 
makes operational sense, but since IDA is a fixed pool of resources that gets distributed 
each year based on the CPIA, there is no consideration of any country’s particular debt 
sustainability.  The part of the World Bank that worries about debt levels is not the same 
part that determines new lending.   Ironically, this results in some of the best-performing 
countries―Tanzania, Uganda, Ghana, Mozambique―requiring the most debt relief.     
The Bank hopes to avoid repeating this problem in the future by increasing the use of 
grants within IDA and by implementing a new framework linking debt levels to new 
lending (IMF/IDA, March 2005). 
 
Past debt relief 
 
As early as the 1970s, bilateral creditors began writing off debts to some low-income 
countries.  Over time, the Paris Club of official creditors added ever softer terms for low-
income countries:  Toronto terms provided 33% debt stock reduction in 1988, London 
terms of 50% in 1991, Naples terms of 67% in 1994, and then Cologne terms of 90% in   7
1999.  Most African countries used these facilities to restructure and reduce their debts in 
the 1980s, with many countries returning to the Paris Club repeatedly.   Indeed, between 
1980 and 2000, 17 African countries reached six or more different agreements with the 
Paris Club.  Many of the bilateral creditors also went a step further than Cologne terms 
and gave 100% write-offs. 
 
By the mid-1990s, Paris Club reductions did not seem to be achieving the aim of debt 
sustainability and the calls for more widespread relief were mounting.  The new president 
of the World Bank James Wolfensohn, whose tenure began in 1995, was also convinced 
that more needed to be done to help poor countries cope with their debt problems.  The 
following year, the Bank and the IMF, both of which had resisted debt relief in the past 
for legal and practical reasons, conceded and created the Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC) initiative.   
 
HIPC provides extra relief for those countries that still exceed a defined debt 
sustainability threshold (mainly a debt stock-to-export ratio above 150 percent) after a 
Paris Club write-down of bilateral stock.  If a country qualifies and meets other 
performance criteria, they are deemed to reach ‘decision point,’ where interim relief is 
provided.  If the country stays on track with its reforms and shows that any savings from 
debt relief are being used wisely, then the country can reach the ‘completion point,’ 
which is for irrevocable relief with permanent write-downs of debt stock.  In 1999 the 
HIPC initiative was enhanced further and the terms were softened again.  Uganda was the 
first country to benefit from HIPC, entering the program in 1997 and reaching completion 
point in May 2000.  As of May 2006, 40 countries are HIPC-qualified (33 of which are 
African) and 19 of these (15 African) have reached completion point (See Table 1). There 
are eleven ‘pre-decision point’ countries, which could still qualify before the current 
sunset of HIPC at the end of 2006.
3 
 
                                                 
3 Eritrea, Kyrgyz Republic, and Haiti were added in 2006 and Laos and Burma were removed.   8
Table 1: HIPC countries, as of May 2006 
 





























Sao Tome and Principe 
Sierra Leone 
 












Source: World Bank 
* Cameroon reached completion point on May 1, 2006 
** Mauritania has since been excluded from the MDRI because the IMF determined that macroeconomic management 




Despite increasingly generous debt relief programs and nearly a decade of HIPC, many of 
the participating countries were still complaining about debt service obligations.  Because 
bilateral debt was reduced through the Paris Club and most of the bilateral creditors have 
now switched from loans to grants for the poorest countries, the remaining piece of HIPC 
debt was owed mainly to the multilateral institutions (Figure 4).  Thus, in 2005 the major 
economic powers—which also happen to be both the main creditors and the controlling 
shareholders at the multilateral institutions—agreed to tackle this residual debt once and 
for all.  The Commission for Africa (2005), chaired by Prime Minister Tony Blair, also 
called for 100 percent debt cancellation for sub-Saharan Africa.  These trends all helped 
bring about a major conceptual shift:  for the first time, the major international financial 
institutions accepted the premise of moving toward full debt relief.   
   9
Figure 4 























In the lead up to the G8 Summit at Gleneagles, it was clear that some new mechanism 
was likely to emerge. The UK proposed that the donors assume responsibility for debt 
service and just make payments to the multilateral institutions on behalf of the indebted 
countries.  They argued that this would free resources in poor countries to spend on other 
priorities and that it would also ensure ‘additionality’.  The US made an alternative 
proposal also to move to 100 percent relief, but to have the World Bank and IMF cover 
the lost income from internal resources.  The Bush administration suggested that the 
Bank simply net out any debt service from new IDA credits to each country.  The main 
benefit of this option was that, unlike the UK plan, the debt itself could be taken off the 
books, cleaning up the accounts for both the creditors and the debtors.  The effect on cash 
flow for debtor countries would be neutral and it was thought more politically viable 
since it would also not have any budget implications for the donors.  (A third European 
proposal was also floated which tinkered with the existing HIPC debt sustainability 
threshold, but this was rejected by both the UK and the US.) 
 
Ahead of Gleneagles, a compromise was reached.  The eventual MDRI is based largely 
on the US proposal, but also includes additional resources ‘dollar for dollar’.  Some of 
the non-G8 members, along with World Bank staff, had raised strenuous objections to the 
plan, claiming that it might imperil the Bank’s future financial health since there was no 
guarantee that shareholders would cover any lost revenue.  The US had initially 
dismissed any such concerns since reflows from HIPCs represented such a tiny 
proportion of Bank income, but the Europeans maintained that it might become a   10
problem in the future. This final hurdle was overcome at the last minute through the 
signing of an extraordinary letter by the leading finance ministers pledging to compensate 
the World Bank for any lost future income from forsaken reflows.  (There is no such 
provision for the IMF, which is expected to use resources from previous gold 
revaluations and other internal resources.)  The major shareholders also have tried to 
avoid some of the problems of re-lending to HIPC countries by creating an expanded 
IDA and AfDB grant window for the poorest and most-indebted.    
 
What should we expect from the MDRI? 
 
The MDRI achieves what debt campaigners might have thought impossible just a few 
years ago:  close to full debt relief for some of the world’s poorest countries.
4  What then 
are reasonable expectations of the effect of this achievement for the previously-indebted 
countries?  A good place to start is to assess the various costs of high debt which should 
soon be lifted.  ‘Drop the debt’ was always partly a moral argument that it was 
unconscionable for poor countries to pay money to rich ones.  But proponents also made 
a more practical claim that money spent on servicing debts took away resources from 
other priorities, such as social services.  Additionally, there are three other areas where 
high levels of debt are thought to have possible negative effects and where debt relief 
might therefore have a lasting positive effect:  growth, policies, and institutional 
development. 
 
Social services and poverty 
 
Activist appeals for debt relief are typically justified on the basis of diverted resources, 
thus the common comparison by Jubilee, Oxfam, and other campaigners of the size of 
debt service versus other spending such as education or health care.  The implied 
argument here is three-fold: (1) countries unwillingly spend money servicing debt that 
would otherwise be used on social services; (2) money is a crucial binding constraint on 
raising welfare; and (3) the size of debt service is big enough to have a meaningful effect 
on those outcomes.  If these are all true, then nearly 100 percent debt relief should lead 
not only to vast increases in social services spending, but also have an immediate positive 
impact on poverty rates and other developmental indicators.  
 
Unfortunately, there are problems with all three propositions.  There is some evidence 
that social service spending has risen following debt relief in the past.  The IMF for 
instance claims ‘poverty reducing expenditures’ in HIPCs has gone up from 6.4 percent 
of GDP in 1999 to 7.9 percent in 2004.  However, it is far from clear that this is the result 
of debt relief given the increasing trend of donor earmarking for social services.  This is 
non-trivial since aid inflows average nearly 60 percent of total public expenditure in the 
15 sub-Saharan completion point HIPCs. 
 
                                                 
4 In practice, countries will not get 100 percent relief because the MDRI does not cover commercial debt or 
any residual bilateral debt.  In addition, the multilateral portion has cut-off dates for eligible debt stock, 
end-2004 for the IMF and the AfDB and end-2003 for the World Bank.     11
Second, there is an extremely weak connection between expenditure and development 
outcomes.  Greater health care spending does not mean better health and more money for 
schools does not necessarily mean more kids in school.  Empirically, there is no 
relationship between, say, average expenditure on education and school enrolment or 
between health expenditure and child mortality.  There is a long literature exploring this 
apparent paradox, with most of the evidence pointing toward problems deeper than 
funding levels, such as weak management, poor quality services, and in some cases low 
demand (Filmer, Hammer and Pritchett, 2000).  Whatever the reason in each country, it 
simply cannot be assumed that shifts in spending from debt service to social services, if it 
occurs, will lead to vastly improved living conditions for Africa’s poor. 
 
Third, the scale of resources involved in the MDRI is relatively small.  Although HIPCs 
have been complaining loudly about the burden of servicing World Bank debt, the size of 
such flows has in reality been almost insignificant.  The 15 African HIPCs paid on 
average $19 million in debt service to IDA in 2004.  But that same year, they received on 
average $197 million in new IDA credits and $946 million in total aid.  In other words, 
the debt service they paid to the World Bank was less than one-tenth of what they 
received from the Bank in new money and less than one-fiftieth of all aid inflows.  This 
suggests that the short-term increase in resources from the cancellation of IDA debt 
obligations would be on the order of 2-3 percent of total aid receipts.  Since aid flows to 
these countries over the past decade has typically fluctuated (up or down) by about $150 
million per year, it is difficult to imagine that the savings will make a palpable 
difference.
5   
 
                                                 
5 Although these figures suggest that the financial impact on HIPCs from the MDRI will be negligible in 
the short-term, the effect could grow over time; by some World Bank estimates (subject to various 
assumptions), the overall cost could possibly reach about six times current levels by 2026.     12
Table 2:  Resource flows to African HIPCs, 2004 
(US$ millions) 
 
  IDA debt service  New IDA inflows  All ODA 
Benin 11 37 378
Burkina Faso  9 130 610
Cameroon 19 97 762
Ethiopia 21 476 1823
Ghana 39 288 1358
Madagascar 24 308 1236
Mali 17 70 567
Mauritania 6 42 180
Mozambique 5 194 1228
Niger 6 72 536
Rwanda 5 144 468
Senegal 29 166 1052
Tanzania 41 474 1746
Uganda 30 300 1159
Zambia 16 156 1081
  
average 19 197 946
 
Source: OECD, World Bank 
 
In addition to the small scale of the potential savings from debt relief, it is also clear that 
there will be no financial windfall for qualified countries from the MDRI by design.  As 
per the agreement, any savings from forgiven IDA debt service obligations will be netted 
out of future IDA flows to that country.  Since IDA is allocated through a formula 
including a measure of poverty and the CPIA performance score, countries will earn a 
theoretical IDA allocation but actually only receive that amount minus what they would 
have repaid IDA had the debt not been cancelled.  The compromise for extra resources 
kicked in by the donors stipulates that this additional funding is not earmarked for those 
specific countries, but rather goes into the general IDA pool for allocation through the 
normal channels.  Since many of the HIPCs are also among the top scorers on the CPIA 
they may see an increase from the slightly larger pooled reflows, but since this pool goes 
to more than 60 countries, any increase will necessarily be significantly smaller than their 
individual debt service savings. 
 
Economic growth  
 
A large literature has addressed the links between debt and economic growth (Pattillo, 
Poirson and Ricci, 2002).  The most common explanation is the so-called ‘debt overhang’ 
whereby a high debt burden dampens the incentive to invest because investors expect that 
distortionary measures may be taken such as higher future taxes. This delays potential 
investment, discourages long-term investment in productivity, and can create liquidity 
shortages.  Despite these possible channels, empirical studies have failed to identify 
whether such a debt overhang exists, with the evidence particularly unclear for the low-  13
income countries (perhaps because they receive so little private investment).  Given this 
ambiguity, hopes for a significant boost to HIPC country growth rates from the latest debt 
deal appear unrealistic. 
 
  Policy reform dynamics 
 
Unsustainable debt is itself an indicator of poor management and weak policies.  Indeed, 
all of the HIPCs are in the midst of major economic reform efforts of some kind.   
However, the presence of high debt and debt service obligations may create policy 
pressures that undercut some of those very reforms by distorting policy dynamics, such as 
encouraging an overly short-term orientation or a weakening of public support for 
reforms.  The nearly full debt cancellation possible under the MDRI could therefore 
provide a boost to the recipient governments undergoing reform, especially if lingering 
debt has been a barrier to pushing through changes.  However, there is little evidence that 
past debt relief has led to detectable policy improvements, again suggesting that the 
short-term outcome is likely to be modest (Chauvin and Kraay, 2005). 
 
A potentially important effect on policies from full debt cancellation could be on the 
creditor side.  There is strong evidence that creditors engage in defensive lending 
(making new loans mainly to cover old ones) and that this undermines the ability of 
donors to be selective in their allocations (Birdsall, Claessens and Diwan, 2002).  If the 
debt is no longer a factor in lending/grant decisions, then donors could find it easier to 
direct their resources to better-performers and to withdraw assistance from non-
performers.  Although it is merely speculation at this point, this could be a strongly 
positive effect.  (If this does occur, it could be another unexpected outcome for debt relief 





High debt, through the contribution toward ongoing fiscal crises and by the heavy 
administrative burden on weak public institutions, may also impede the development of 
capable states (Radelet, 2005).  Many of the HIPCs not only face capacity constraints in 
public administration and budget management, but they often struggle even to provide 
basic public services. Debt management is one essential if complex responsibility of the 
state and requires high levels of technical skill and political influence. Measuring the 
administrative cost of managing debt is difficult, but Paris Club rescheduling is one 
possible proxy.  Each time a country goes to the Paris Club it involves a huge set of 
analytical, legal and negotiating skills monopolized for months at a time. Unsurprisingly 
higher debt countries return to the Paris Club more often (Moss and Chiang, 2003).     
Senegal has sought rescheduling 13 times since 1980, while Madagascar and Niger have 
done so 10 times apiece.  Much of the time and effort committed by public officials to 
debt could now be redeployed in other more productive areas.  Although this is 
conjecture, this might have a positive long-term impact on state capacity.  But even in a 
best case scenario, such benefits would not become evident for many years and the cause 




The new MDRI will significantly cut the debt stock levels of a core set of indebted low-
income countries.  It is likely that neither HIPC nor the MDRI would have been agreed 
had anti-debt activists not used emotional appeals to poverty reduction to build support.  
Juxtaposing debt service against social services and high levels of need in poor countries 
has undoubtedly been politically effective, both with the wider public and with 
policymakers.  However, the actual short-term financial impact for the affected countries 
is unlikely to have a meaningful effect on either government finances or on poverty 
reduction anytime soon.  The numbers are simply too small and finances are often not the 
binding constraint.  In other words, debt relief is not likely to have a huge effect because 
the debt burden was never as harmful as campaigners frequently claimed and the 
channels in which debt affects development are different than commonly believed.  This 
is not to say that the MDRI is not a good idea, but rather that most of the impact, if any, 
will be long term and difficult to measure.  As such, expectations of the effect on 
indebted countries and development indicators should be kept modest and time horizons 
long.   
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